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Executive Summary
The current military map that has emerged following the fall 
of Aleppo, and the gradual purging of dozens of rebel towns in 
Rif Damascus in 2016, is the culmination of dynamics that were 
initiated as early as in 2013. They were accelerated following 
Russia’s direct military involvement in September 2015: the rise of 
Iranian and Russian presence on the ground; the disengagement 
of Gulf and Western countries; the gradual elimination of non-
jihadist armed rebel forces; and the emergence of new spheres of 
influence (Turkish and Kurdish). Syria has in fact entered a new 
era, marked by the ultimate defeat of Syrian-Revolution forces 
that are now confined to increasingly narrow territorial pockets, 
and by the assertion of a new troika (Russia, Turkey and Iran) 
on both the military and diplomatic level.  The conflict itself, 
however, seems to remain far from over.
The fall of Aleppo consecrates, above all, the failure of the non-
jihadist rebel groups, which have been deeply divided over their 
positions towards Jahbat Fatah al Sham (ex-Jahbat al Nusra). The 
most recent military developments also mean a considerable 
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reduction in space and scope of action for the civilian 
opposition forces and, more broadly, they put the 
Syrian opposition in a critical position with limited 
choices. 
Capitalising on their respective military successes in 
2016, Russia and Turkey, and to a lesser extent Iran, 
are now at the epicentre of the diplomatic process 
(national ceasefire at the end of December, then 
Astana talks in January 2017). However, this new 
troika’s ability to stabilise Syria remains uncertain. 
While Russia maintains ties of mutual dependence 
with its two regional partners, strategic discrepancies 
have already undermined the national ceasefire 
agreement and could jeopardise any effort to end the 
conflict. In addition, influence-sharing between the 
three stronger countries on the ground still remains 
unclear. 
Above all, the ability of the new major players 
to administrate these newly controlled areas, in 
cooperation or in friction with the Syrian regime, 
may face at least three main challenges that could 
threaten to plunge Syria into further violence and 
chaos: the expansion of more radical jihadist groups, 
the persisting dispute over the Kurdish issue, and 
the hard-liner objectives and practices of the Syrian 
regime.
On the debris of Aleppo: A Gloomy and 
Uncertain Reconstruction for Syria1
The fall of Aleppo in December 2016 by no means 
represents the Syrian regime’s most important victory 
since the beginning of the uprising, but rather an 
assertion of Russian and Iranian authority in Syria. 
While the takeover of the city of Homs in 2014, and 
the gradual purging of dozens of rebel towns in Rif 
Damascus in 2016 through local “truce agreements”, 
hold great strategic significance in maintaining and 
consolidating the vital heart of the Syrian regime, 
1.  The sources of this policy brief include around twenty 
interviews with Syrian opposition actors collected in 
Turkey between 5 and 19 December 2016, in addition 
to open-source data (until 19 January 2017, the time of 
writing).
the fall of Aleppo is important for other reasons. 
It symbolises the ultimate defeat of the Syrian 
Revolution’s civilian and military forces, which is 
the culmination of a series of dynamics initiated as 
early as the inaction of Western countries in response 
to the chemical attacks of 2013. These dynamics 
were further accelerated by Russia’s direct military 
involvement in September 2015: the rise of Iranian, 
and then Russian, presence on the ground, in parallel 
with disengagement by Gulf and Western countries; 
the gradual elimination of non-jihadist armed rebel 
forces, which are now confined to increasingly 
narrow territorial pockets (Eastern Ghouta, a few 
localities in Idlib governorate, in the northern and 
western countryside of Aleppo and in the south of the 
country); the emergence of new spheres of influence 
(Turkish and Kurdish), which have yet to be stabilised 
and which are in competition in the struggle against 
the Islamic State.
1. The Aleppo Loss: Meanings For the 
Opposition 
As the political opposition was almost hardly 
considered after the failure of Geneva 3 in February 
2016, two main categories of opposition actors have 
remained at the forefront of the scene: armed groups 
and civil society organisations. 
Ultimately, non-jihadist rebel groups, which 
constituted the overwhelming majority of forces in 
Eastern Aleppo, appear to be the biggest losers in the 
city. Above all, their swift defeat has been a result of the 
internal schisms that plagued the groups and stifled 
most of their attempts at planned offensives to break 
the Aleppo siege - imposed by the Syrian regime and 
its allies as of August 2016.2 These internal divisions 
are not novel (for instance, the armed groups were 
never able to form a Joint Operations Command in 
Aleppo, unlike the situation in the Idlib governorate 
in 2015). The divisions have indeed intensified since 
2.  See “The Battles to Break the Siege of Aleppo: Military and 
Political Implications”, Policy Analysis Unit- ACRPS,  22 
August 2016. Youssef Sadaki, “The Political Moves Behind 
the Siege of Aleppo”, Deeply Syria, 16 August 2016,. 
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the fall in 2016, precisely when the Syrian regime and 
its allies launched their last major offensive against 
Aleppo. Tensions have generally revolved around 
the positions of all rebel factions towards Jahbat 
Fatah al Sham (JFS). Disputes within the military-
opposition arena have been largely influenced (from 
the beginning) by the US, UN and - of late - Turkey, 
pushing for the opposition’s clear dissociation from 
JFS, in spite of al-Golani’s announcement in the 
summer of 2016, claiming the severance of JFS ties 
with al Qaeda. The spectrum of Russian-American 
military coordination in the fight against JFS - 
under the terms of the agreement between the two 
states in September 2016 - has also played a role 
in intensifying internal disagreements. Moreover, 
these disputes reflect conflicts of power between 
warlords. For example, in early November 2016, 
local communities in Aleppo received a blow due 
to infighting between two major groups of the Free 
Syrian Army (FSA) in Eastern Aleppo, the Fastaqim 
Union and Nour al Din Al Zanki (which had recently 
moved closer to JFS), caused by personal divergences 
between their respective leaders. More importantly, 
the most powerful Islamist rebel group in Northern 
Syria - Ahrar al Sham - was torn apart during the last 
leadership elections, into a Turkish-baked “pragmatic” 
faction and hard-line rivals seeking a merger with 
JSF.3 Even if it seems unlikely that Ahrar al Sham’s 
two factions would be ready to enter a fratricidal war, 
the tensions that have arisen have greatly reduced the 
rebel group’s defensive capability during the battle of 
Aleppo.
For the majority of Syrian civil activists, the rebel 
brigades bear enormous responsibility for the Aleppo 
debacle, and have lost the confidence of the majority of 
the population. They appear unable to protect civilian 
populations and are “motivated solely to maintain 
3.  Five members of the hardliner group suspended their 
membership and on 10 December 2016 announced the 
creation of a new faction within the movement, Jaish al 
Ahrar. See Aron Lund, Divided, They may fall, Carnegie 
Diwan, 14 December 2016.  
their power over miniscule portions of territory”.4 The 
apparent paradox is the role that Russia and Turkey 
assigned to these armed groups immediately after their 
defeat in Aleppo. The armed groups were summoned 
by Ankara to sign the nationwide ceasefire declared on 
29 December 2016, and were also placed at the centre 
of the Russian initiative to relaunch negotiations in 
the Astana talks (set to be held on 23-25 January)5.
On another level, the fall of Aleppo was a painful 
setback for Syrian civil activists, who have been 
forcibly evicted from the city. Around one hundred 
local Syrian organisations, often led by activists from 
West Aleppo, as well as 75 neighbourhood councils 
and the local city council were active in the city’s 
eastern districts. The forced displacement of the entire 
population from these districts is therefore devastating 
for local civilian leaders, who had no choice but to take 
refuge in the western and northeastern countryside of 
the governorate, or further west in the Idlib region. 
The loss of Aleppo, and the new military map that 
is emerging today, implies a considerable reduction 
in space (and scope of action) for civil society 
organisations. 
For many activists, the Idlib governorate, which in 
recent months has hosted many fighters and civilian 
cadres from the evacuated localities of Rif Damascus, 
is considered a “worst case scenario”. On the one 
hand, Idlib remains a stronghold for JFS, which has 
not hesitated in obstructing the activities of several 
civil society organisations over the last two years. On 
the other hand, all observers anticipate one of the 
two following - but non-exclusive - scenarios in the 
coming months: a joint US-Russia counter-terrorism 
4.  Interviews by the author with local activists in Gaziantep, 
Turkey (5-19 December 2016).
5.  As may be expected, the Astana talks once again divided 
the brigades gathered in Ankara by the Turks: nine 
brigades decided to attend it, as opposed to five who 
refused to go (especially Ahrar al Sham). See Ibrahim 
Hamidi, 17 January 2017, Al Hayat newspaper (in Arabic). 
After intense pressures from the Turkish side, thirteen 
brigades were on the final attendance list on 19 January 
2017. 
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airstrike campaign to take back (or to destroy) Idlib; 
and/or fratricide infighting between armed groups, or 
in the words of a Syrian, who is very well-connected 
with armed groups in the area, “Idlib will be like a 
Gaza Strip, where armed groups will kill one another 
with only one border crossing point (Bab al Hawa)”.6 
In contrast to Idlib, the area spanning Azaz to 
Jarablous - or more broadly, the area of new Turkish 
influence - is perceived by many civil activists to be a 
last sanctuary, where they could pursue their activities 
and attempt to build a democratic alternative to 
both the Syrian regime and the Islamic State. In fact, 
‘Operation Euphrates Shield’, launched on 24 August 
2016 by the Turkish army in close coordination with 
some FSA brigades, has secured an area of 2000 square 
kilometres in Aleppo’s northern region. However, this 
area is far from entirely secure (a suicide attack took 
place in the main city of Azzaz on 7 January 2017). It 
still remains an area of military activity (which aims 
to take back the strategic city of Al Bab, see below), 
that has until now limited the establishment of new 
local structures across the area. 
The fall of Aleppo is not the end of the political 
and armed opposition in Syria, but the last military 
developments (beyond of Aleppo) put them in 
a critical position with limited choices. Syrian 
opposition actors, as they acknowledged themselves, 
need to review their positions and strategies, and 
should generate new tools and mechanisms to address 
a new phase that is full of uncertainties.  
2. A New Troika to Stabilise Syria?
The forced evacuation of Aleppo was followed almost 
immediately by a tripartite announcement (Russia, 
Turkey and Iran) calling for a national ceasefire in 7 
points at the end of December, and then a return to intra-
6.  In the past, intense clashes have already taken place in this 
area, such as those between Jahbat al Nusra and the Syria 
Revolutionary Front in 2014, or more recently, between 
Ahrar al-Sham and Jund al-Aqsa in October 2016. On 19 
January 2017, JFS launched a major offensive against some 
positions of Ahrar Al Sham in the Jisr–al-Choughour area. 
Syrian talks in Astana, Kazakhstan as of 23 January 
2017. In fact, capitalising on their respective military 
successes in 2016, Russia and Turkey, and to a lesser 
extent Iran, had already monopolised the negotiations 
in Aleppo, from which the US and the UN had largely 
been excluded. Following the US’s temporary retreat 
during the electoral presidential campaign, and due to 
the EU’s weakness at the diplomatic and defense level, 
Russia has taken centre-stage in the process. Alongside 
its two regional partners, Iran and more recently 
Turkey, Russia maintains ties of mutual dependence. 
To impose ‘its peace’ or its own interpretation of the 
political transition, Russia could benefit from the 
widespread fatigue and disillusionment within the 
Syrian population. However, tactical discrepancies 
are palpable within this troika, which have already 
undermined the agreement of national ceasefire. They 
could increase in the medium term, depending on the 
still uncertain choices of the new US president’s policy. 
The Russia-Turkey rapprochement seems at a 
glance to be the result of negative attitudes by both 
the US and EU towards Turkey, whose authorities 
felt increasing isolation, even betrayal, by Western 
countries in their management of the Syrian crisis 
(notably US disregard for Turkey’s primary strategic 
objectives in Syria), then concerning the coup 
attempt. The latter event has undoubtedly accelerated 
the redefinition of Turkish “national security” and 
marked a strategic shift in the Turkish government. In 
exchange for abandoning the city of Aleppo, Turkey 
would have obtained the green-light from Russia to 
lead ‘Operation Euphrates Shield’ to fight both IS 
and the Kurdish YPG. The objective has effectively 
been the establishment of a safe area under Turkish 
influence (corresponding roughly to that laid out by 
the Turks as early as 2014), which puts an end to the 
PYD project of linking the three Kurdish cantons in 
Northern Syria. However, the Turkish project requires 
the recapture of al-Bab, in which the Islamic State 
is still entrenched, and which appears a key city for 
both Turkey and the PYD, and possibly for the Syrian 
regime (stationed a few kilometers away). Yet, the 
battle of al-Bab is far more challenging than Turkey 
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and its affiliate Syrian armed groups had previously 
anticipated in mid-December. If the Turks originally 
knew that they would not be able to rely on US air 
support, they may have relied hastily, and excessively, 
on the Russians to recapture this strategic area and 
stymie the path of the Kurdish project. Erdogan’s 
government, which is fragile on the domestic level 
and well-aware of the drastic reduction in its margin 
for maneuver on Syrian grounds, has interest, at least 
in the short term, in maintaining its agreement with 
Russia. Putin also needs Turkey to politically capitalise 
on its military gains in Syria (in this sense, the 
assassination of the Russian ambassador in Ankara did 
not have any major negative consequences). The two 
countries nevertheless displayed divergent visions on 
the expectations of the Astana conference. While the 
Turks expressed their willingness to limit it to military 
actors, and to consolidate the truce, the Russians were 
more disposed to negotiating the details of a political 
resolution.
The relationship between Russia and Iran - the two 
main supporters of the Syrian regime since 2011 
- is perhaps even more complex and obscure. In 
fact, pro-Iranian militias played a spoiler role in 
the implementation of the agreement to evacuate 
Aleppo’s population, and imposed a new deal which 
included the evacuation of two Shia localities in the 
Idlib countryside in exchange for leaving Aleppo. The 
Syrian regime and Lebanese Hezbollah have also been 
at the frontlines of the more severe violations of the 
truce - of which Russia is one of two guarantors - in 
the region of Wadi Barada (north-west of Damascus), 
where the latest military campaign was launched on 
the 22 December and remained underway until 19 
January (the time of writing). Breaches to the ceasefire 
that have also occurred in Eastern Ghouta, in Idlib 
and in Deraa in the South go to discredit the Russians 
(seen by the Syrian opposition as either enabled to 
be a guarantor or as playing a double-sided role) and 
could jeopardise any serious efforts to a sustainable 
political solution. 
These recent events illustrate different approaches 
adopted by the Russians and the Iranians, and even 
divergent strategic interests in the longer term. For 
the time being, the Russians have begun to take hold 
in economically strategic areas (through one military 
base in Hamamein near the port of Tartous for the 
control of economic trade, and one in Palmyra in the 
centre of Syria for the control of gas and oil fields, in 
addition to one big military base in Hama), and they 
bet on the reformation and reconstruction of a Syrian 
Army nucleus (through the founding of the 4th and 
5th Corps). For their part, the Iranians rely mainly on 
Shiite militia (Lebanese, Iraqi and Afghan) and Syrian 
paramilitary forces (the National Defense forces). 
They could have pleaded for forced displacement of 
Sunni populations from Central Syria (Rif Damascus 
and Homs) to the North (Idlib) to consolidate a Shi’ite 
buffer zone on the Lebanese border. They may also 
have a pipe-dream to expand to the South, but their 
intentions here are limited by the Israeli red lines (with 
the implicit agreement of the Russians). For many 
Syrians who have opposed the Syrian regime for six 
years, conquering Aleppo has been perceived as an 
immense victory for Iran first, but doubts remain over 
its ability to settle and rule in a “Sunni ocean”. 
Beyond preferential territories (the coastal zone for 
the Russians, the border area of Lebanon between 
Homs and Damascus for the Iranians, and the Turkish 
zone in the North), influence-sharing between the 
three stronger countries on the ground still remains 
unclear. Above all, their capacity to administrate these 
areas, in cooperation or in friction with the Syrian 
regime, may face major challenges.
3. Prospects for Syria: More Violence and 
Chaos
Following the recent geopolitical and strategic shifts, 
the Syrian regime and its allies, as well as several 
Western capitals, are expecting security and economic 
reconstruction to be paramount for the stakes of 2017. 
However, at least three main challenges threaten to 
plunge Syria into a situation of even greater violence and 
chaos than it has experienced thus far: the expansion of 
more radical jihadist groups, the continuing struggle 
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over the Kurdish issue, and the hard-liner objectives 
and practices of the Syrian regime. 
The conclusion of the battle of Eastern Aleppo, which 
has been perceived by its inhabitants as a “Shiite 
Iranian invasion”,7 is likely to reinforce the most radical 
tendencies within Islamist groups, and to accelerate acts 
of bloody retaliation against the self-proclaimed victors. 
In the short and medium term, the Islamic State, which 
had not been a priority target for the Russians or the 
Iranians in Syria, could try to capitalise on the defeat 
of non-jihadist groups in Aleppo (The IS offensive on 
Palmyra and T4 airport in December 2016 probably 
aimed to polarise sympathies of a fringe among Sunnis). 
Jabhat Fateh al Sham, though weakened by its failures 
in Aleppo and by internal defections,8 remains the 
main military force in the Idlib governorate. Formally 
excluded from all the agreements in 2016 on ceasing 
hostilities, JFS also positions itself as the main bastion 
of resistance to the advances of the Syrian regime, and 
thus appears to be one of the primary local spoilers of 
the Russian-Turkish sponsored truce (as was the case 
in Wadi Barada). In the longer term, the fight against 
the Islamic state, JFS or other even more radical groups 
likely to emerge, has no chance of succeeding if the 
modalities of intervention by international actors are 
not redefined. In fact, the targeted-bombing tactic to 
eliminate the leaders of these jihadist groups cannot 
achieve any results without well-grounded support 
to the local civil actors and without a genuine Sunni 
reconstruction project capable of offering a political 
alternative to the majority of the Syrian population.
The fight against the Islamic state is further undermined 
by competition between Syrian armed groups (Arabs 
and Turkmen) supported by Ankara on the one hand, 
and the Syrian Democratic Forces dominated by the 
7.  Interviews of the author with Aleppo residents in mid-
December 2016. See also The Guardian, 29 September 
2016  : https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/29/
aleppo-attack-foreign-syrian-fighters-plan-shia-islamic
8.  Some of its leaders would be in favour of recreating a 
branch of al Qaeda in Syria, under the name Taliban al 
Sham, http://syrianobserver.com/EN/Features/32081/
Taliban_Sham_A_New_Branch_Al_Qaeda_Syria
Kurdish PYD and supported by the US on the other. 
It is unlikely that the new US administration will 
be quick to change its policy, unless it is convinced 
that the PYD project is primarily an Iranian one, as 
advocated by some Kurdish opponents of the PYD. So 
far, the US has insisted that the SDF will lead the battle 
of Raqqa, which is crucial not only in the fight against 
the Islamic State but also, and ultimately, over the 
ethnic-community balance in this area. If doubts are 
expressed about the ability of the PYD’s Kurdish forces 
alone to win a military battle for Raqqa, their ability 
to manage this vast rural area, characterised by strong 
Arab tribal structures, is likely to be problematic. The 
military involvement of PYD in non-Kurdish majority 
areas is likely to fuel further tensions between the 
two communities, anchored since the clashes in the 
Northern Aleppo governorate in late 2015.
Finally, the primary objective of the Syrian regime is 
to regain military control over most of the territory, 
through military escalation and/or agreements with 
local actors. In this context, the question of security and 
stabilisation seems crucial. It is at the epicentre of the 
ongoing Russian-Turkish negotiation process, whose 
main issue is the reconstruction of a Syrian national 
army. It is also at the core of local deals made by the 
regime and some opposition actors.9 Analysis of these 
local dynamics poses the hypothesis of a return to the 
security state (establishment of districts or entire cities in 
military zones, expansion of compulsory conscription, 
failure of the model of shared administration on 
security level), but also of its limitations (increase in the 
multitude of kidnappings and assassinations in several 
regions, empowerment and increased autonomy of 
paramilitary forces and Shiite foreign militias).
9.  See, for example, a case study by The Unit, about Wadi 
Barada, Analytical Overview, 17 January 2017, Beirut. 
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